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[Sac. No. 6531. In Bank. Apr. 19. 1955.] 
ROY C. JENSEN et al., Appellants, v. FLOYD MINARD, 
Respondent. 
[1] Negligence-Ordinary Oare: Burden of Proof.-In ordinary 
negligence cases standard of care is ordinary care uuder cir-
cumstances, and burden of proof is on plaintiff. 
[2] Weapons - Civil Liability - Tests.-Rules of law governing 
actions for injuries caused by discharge of firearms are not 
different from rules governing actions for any injuries claimed 
to have been inflicted tiy negligence of defendant, but owing 
to dangerous character of such weapons a perSOll handling 
them is held to high degree of care and, if he does not use 
degree of care uppropriate to circumstances and injury results, 
he will be Hable. 
[8] Id.-Oivil Liability-Instructions.-In action. for death of 
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's rifle, it is 
proper to instruct jury that negligence is failure to use ordi-
nary care, that in exercise of such care amount of caution 
required will vary in accordance with nature of act and sur-
rounding circumstances, that amount of caution required by 
law increases as does danger reasonably to be apprehended, 
that ordinary care while firing gun requires that person firing 
gun must exercise extreme caution while so doing, and that 
jury must find defendant negligent if it finds that he did not 
use extreme caution. 
[4] Id. - Oivil Liability - Instructions.-In action for death of 
child who was struck by bullet from dofendant's rifle, it is 
not error to refuse to instruct jury that one who causes in-.. 
[2] See Oal.Jur., Weapons, § 3; Am.Jur., Weapons and Firearms, 
§ 22 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, §§ 21, 128; [2-7] Weap-
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jury to another by discharging firearm must show that he was 
absolutely without fault where, to extent such instruction 
relates to standard of care, it is adequately covered by other 
instructions on subject, and to extent it purports to place 
burden of proof on defendant it is erroneous. 
[5a,5b] Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death of 
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's rifle, it is 
prejudicial error to instruct jury that mere fact that accident 
happened, considered alone, does not support inference that 
some or any party to action was negligent, since such instruc-
tion in effect tells jury that fact that child was killed by bullet 
from defendant's gun affords no evidence of negligence, and 
since, though instructions on res ipsa loquitur were not re-
quested, jury should not be foreclosed from considering evi-
dence provided by happening of accident itself in determining 
whether defendant was negligent. 
[6] Id.-Civil Liability.-Ordinarily accidents resulting from dis-
charge of firearms do not occur if persons using them use due 
care. 
[?] Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death of 
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's rifle, it is 
error to instruct jury that "unavoidable" or "inevitable" acci-
dent simply denotes accident that occurred without having 
been proximately caused by negligence, and that even if such 
accident could have been avoided by exercise of exceptional 
foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be held liable for 
injuries resulting from it. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis-
laus County and from an order denying a new trial. Sherrill 
Halbert, Judge. Judgment reversed; appeal from order dis-
missed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. JUdgment for 
defendant reversed. 
Vernon F. Gant for Appellants. 
David F. Bush and Bush, Ackley & Milich for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Juugment was entered on a verdict for 
defendant in an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs appeal 
from the judgment and the order denying their motion for 
a new trial. Since the latter order is not appealable, the 
appeal therefrom is dismissed. 
On May 21, 1951, Bonnie, 12, and her sister, Carolyn, 8, 
got off the school bus at the intersection of Wren and Sierra 
J:oada m Stwlislaus County at about 4 :10 p. m. and started 
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homeward along Wren Road. Defendant's home is located 
near and just to the west of the intersection of Wren and 
Sierra roads, which bound his farm land on the east and 
north. He testified that he was acquainted with the Jensen 
children and had frequently seen them get off the bus at 
Wren and Sierra roads. He saw t.hern get off on the day in 
question while he was sitting with a friend on the patio of 
his home and watched them proceed along Wren Road 
until they were lost from view. At about this time he stood 
up and fired a .22 caliber rifle at a sparrow in his straw-
berry patch approximately 60 or 65 feet away. He looked 
up and down Wren Road and into the field beyond before 
firing and the children were not in sight. Shortly after firing 
the rifle, he heard a child scream, and he ran toward Wren 
Road and found Bonnie lying on the road approximately 180 
feet south of his line of fire and approximately 200 yards 
from the point of firing. She had been struck in the head 
by a bullet from his gun and died later that day. To support 
their theory that defendant must have fired in the direction 
of the children, plaintiffs introduced expert testimony in-
dicating that the bullet had not ricocheted. Defendant intro-
duced expert testimony indicating that it had. To prove 
that he was not negligent in failing to foresee the possibility 
of harm from a richochet, he presented expert testimony that 
the chance of the accident's happening as a result of a ricochet 
was only one in ten million. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that "One who causes injury to another by 
discharging a firearm must, in order to excuse himself from 
liability, show that he was absolutely without fault." This 
instruction, taken from the opinion of the court in Rudd v. 
Byrnes, 156 Cal. 636, 640 [105 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 26 
L.R.A.N.S. 134], not only requires that the defendant be 
absolutely without fault but places the burden of proof of this 
issue on him. [1] In ordinary negligence cases, however, 
the standard of care is ordinary care under the circumstances 
and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The question is 
presented, therefore, whether the court in the Rudd case 
meant to establish a special rule to govern injuries caused 
by firearms. When the language is read in context, it is clear 
that the court did not establish such a rule, but was merely 
emphasizing the proposition that owing to the dangerous 
character of the instrumentality ordinary care in the use 
of firearms requires a very high degree of caution. [2] "In 
) 
) 
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short, the rules of law governing actions for injuries caused 
by the discharge of firearms are not different from the rules 
governing actions for any injuries claimed to have been in-
flicted by the negligence of the defendant. By reason of the 
dangerous nature of such weapons, a person handing them 
is held to a high degree of care. If he had not used the 
degree of care appropriate to the circumstances, and injury 
results, he will be liable to the person injured .... " (Rudd 
v. Byrnes, 156 Cal. 636, 641 [105 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 
26 L.R.A.N.S. 134] ; see also Oucinella v. Weston Biscuit 00., 
42 Ca1.2d 71, 75 [265 P.2d 513] ; Lasater v. Oakland Scavenger 
00., 71 Cal.App.2d 217, 221 [162 P.2d 486].) 
[3] In the present case the jury was properly instructed 
on this theory. Negligence was defined as the failure to use 
ordinary care. The court then pointed out that "inasmuch 
as the amount of caution used by the ordinary prudent person 
varies in direct proportion to the danger known to be in-
volved in his undertaking, it follows that in the exercise of 
ordinary care, the amount of caution required will vary in 
accordance with the nature of the act and the surrounding 
circumstances. To put the matter another way, the amount 
of caution required by the law increases, as does the danger 
that reasonably should be apprehended. . . . What ordinary 
care is in any particular case depends upon what the cir-
cumstances are. Here the defendant was firing a gun which 
is an extremely dangerous activity. Ordinary care while 
firing a gun demands that the person firing the gun must 
exercise extreme caution while so doing. If you find that the 
defendant did not use extreme caution, then you must find 
that he was negligent." 
This case is not one in which the purpose of the shooting 
was unlawful (see Oorn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490 [229 
N.W. 869, 871]), or in which a statute or ordinance prohibits 
the use of any firearms. It is therefore unnecessary to decide 
whether defendant might be liable despite the exercise of 
extreme caution if the shooting were otherwise wrongful. 
[4] Under the circumstances of this case there is no material 
difference between defining ordinary care in the use of fire. 
arlllS in terms of extreme caution or in terms of being abso-
lutely without fault. Thus, to the extent that the requested 
instruction related to the standard of care, it was adequately 
covered by the illstructions that were given, and to the extent 
that it purported to place the burden of proof on defendant, 
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it was erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did not err 
in refusing to give it. 
[5a] The trial court committed prejudicial error, however, 
in giving certain instructions requested by defendant. The 
jury were instructed that "The mere fact that an accident 
happened, considered alone, does not support an inference 
that some party, or any party, to this action was negligent." 
Since it was conceded that the fatal bullet was fired by de-
fendant, this instruction in effect told the jury that the fact 
that Bonnie was killed by a bullet from defendant's gun af-
forded no evidence of negligence. [6] Ordinarily, however, 
accidents of this sort do not occur if those using firearms use 
due care. [5b] Even though instructions on the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur were not requested, the jury should not 
have been foreclosed from considering the evidence provided 
by the happening of the accident itself in determining ,,,,hether 
defendant was negligent. (See Rase v. Melody La.r.e, 39 Cal. 
2d 481, 488 [247 P.2d 335].) [7] Moreover, this error was 
aggravated by the instruction given on unavoidable accidents, 
which stated: "In law we recognize what is termed an un-
avoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean 
literally that it was not possible for such an accident to be 
avoided. They simply denote an accident that occurred 
without having been proximately caused by negligence. Even 
if such an accident could have been avoided by the ~xercise of 
exceptional foresight, skill or caution, still, no one may be 
held liable for injuries resulting from it." Considering these 
instructions together, the jury could easily be led to believe 
that prima facie the accident was unavoidable and was not 
owing to defendant's negligence. It must also be noted that 
the instruction defined unavoidable accidents as including 
those that could have been avoided by the "exercise of ex-
ceptional foresight, skill or caution" thus creating a clear 
con:flict with the correct instruction that ordinary care re-
quires that one using firearms must use extreme caution. 
Although defendant's own expert testified that ric-
ochets from the ground at the angle at which defendant was 
shooting were not unlikely, he also testified that it was highly 
improbable that they would deviate sufficiently from the line 
of fire to endanger Bonnie and that the chance of the acci-
tient's having been caused by a ricochet bullet was only one 
in ten million. Under these circumstances we cannot agree 
with plaintiffs' contention that a8 a matter of law the eviUence 
does not support the verdict. 'fhe possibility of a ricocliet, 
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however, coupled with the fact that the children had just 
passed beyond defendant's field of view would clearly justify 
a finding that defendant did not use extreme caution. Ac-
cordingly, we have concluded that the giving of the erroneous 
instructions resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal but I 
do not agree with the reasoning of the majority upon which 
its conclusion is based. 
It is my considered opinion that the standard of care re-
quired of one who discharges firearms is so high that a person 
can only be excused from liability for injuries caused to others 
by a showing that he was absolutely without fault, and it was 
prejudicial error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
In discussing the standard of care required in firearm cases 
under common law it is stated in Pollock's Law of Torts, 
15th edition (1951), page 386, that" The risk incident to deal-
ing with fire, fire-arms, explosive or highly inflammable mat-
ters, corrosive or otherwise dangerous or noxious fluids, and 
(it is apprehended) poisons, is accounted by the common law 
among those which subject the actor to strict responsibility. 
Sometimes the term 'consummate care' is used to describe the 
amount of caution required, but it is doubtful whether even 
this be strong enough. At least, we do not know of any 
English case of this kind (not falling under some recognized 
head of exception) where unsuccessful diligence on the de-
fendant's part was held to exonerate him." This standard 
which would appear to border upon the doctrine of strict lia-
bility has been interpreted by our American courts in different 
ways. As summed up in American Jurisprudence (vol. 56, 
p. 1006), "The degree of care to be exercised in the use or 
handling of a firearm is determined by the application of 
general rules relating to the care which must be exercised by 
one using dangerous agencies or instrumentalities. It is often 
said that a very high degree of care is required from all 
persons using firearms in the immediate vicinity of others re-
gardless of how lawful or innocent such use may be, or that 
more than ordinary care to prevent injury to others is re-
quired. Some courts refer to the degree of care required 
) 
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as a high degree of care; others say that the utmost or highest 
degree of care must be used to the end that harm may not 
come to others. More often, the requisite degree of care is 
defined as such care as is commensurate with the dangerous 
nature of the firearm. The same degree of care is, no doubt, 
expressed by saying that the care which persons using fire-
arms are bound to take in order to avoid injury to others 
is a care proportionate to the probability of injury to others, 
or by saying that one who has in his possession or under his 
control an instrumentality exceptionally dangerous in char-
acter is bound to take exceptional precautions to prevent an 
injury thereby." On pages 1004-1005 of this same volume it 
is stated that "Some courts have been inclined to hold a 
person to very strict rules of accountability for injuries re-
sulting from the discharge of a firearm. It has been held 
that one is liable civilly for damages for injuries inflicted by 
an unintentional discharge of a firearm unless he shows that 
the injury was unavoidable. In several cases it is said that 
the test of liability is not whether the injury was accidentally 
inflicted, but whether the defendant was free from all blame. 
According to the theory of these cases, it is no defense that 
the act occurred by misadventure, and without the wrong-
doer's intending it. The defendant must show such circum-
stances as would make it ~ppear to the court that the injury 
done to the plaintiff was inevitable, and the defendant was 
not chargeable with any negligence. This view warrants the 
imposition of liability on a person who, voluntarily aiming his 
gun at a particular person or animal, accidentally shoots 
another person or animal. Perhaps in these cases the court 
intended merely to emphasize the care required in the use 
of such a dangerous instrumentality as a firearm; clearly, 
the modern tendency of the court is to apply the general rule 
of negligence where injury or death has been inflicted by 
missiles from a firearm, and to permit the defendant in an 
action for damages to show in defense his freedom from negli-
gence in causing the injury complained of. But even with 
respect to such an action it may be said that one who is in 
possession of a loaded gun is bound to use care proportionate 
to the dangerous nature of the instrument." 
While the courts of this country have approached the 
problem in different ways they have generally required a great 
deal of care from one using firearms. A reading of the cases 
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of care which has been imposed. In Oorn v. Sheppard, 179 
Minn. 490 [229 N.W. 869, 871], the court stated that "Even 
where a gun is accidentally discharged the one handling it 
is liable for the injury caused unless he showed that he was 
entirely free from blame." In Judd v. Ballard, 66 Vt. 668 
[30 A. 96, 97], the court said "The test of liability is not 
whether the injury was accidentally inflicted, but whether the 
• tlefendant was free from blame." In the case of Atchison 
v. Procise, (Mo.App.) 24 S.W.2d 187, 190, the court stated 
that "In such situations all the plaintiff was required to show 
was that defendant fired the shot and that plaintiff was hurt. 
The burden of justification then, shifted to defendant and he 
was required to show that injury was inevitable and utterly 
without fault on his part." For other cases expressing simi-
lar views see Harrison v. Allen, 179 Ill.App. 520; White v. 
Bunn, 346 Mo. 1112 [145 S.W.2d 1381; Annear v. Swartz, 
46 Okla. 98 [148 P. 706] ; Hawksley v. Peace, 38 R.I. 544 [96 
A. 856]; Manning v. Jones, 95 Ark. 359 [129 S.W. 791]; 
Morgan v. Oox, 22 Mo. 373 [66 Am.Dec. 623]. 
In California the extremely high standard to which the 
user of firearms must be held was recognized in the case 
of R'lldd v. Byrnes, 156 Cal. 636, 640 [105 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 
124, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 134], where this court stated that" 'As 
firearms are extraordinarily dangerous, a person who handles 
such a weapon is bound to use extraordinary care to prevent 
injury to others, and is held to strict accountability for a 
want of such care.' (12 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed. 
p. 518; Bahel v. Manning, 112 Mich. 24 [70 N.W. 327, 67 Am. 
St.Rep. 381] ; Judd v. Ballard, 66 Vt. 688 [30 A. 96] ; MoebuB 
v. Becker, 46 N.J.L. 41; lIlorgan v. Oox, 22 Mo. 373 [66 Am. 
Dec. 623].) One who cau.ses injury to another by discharg-
ing a firearm mu.st, in order to excuse himself from liability, 
show that he was absol'lttely without fault. (12 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 519; Bahel v. Manning, 112 Mich. 
24 [70 N.W. 327, 67 Am.St.Rep. 381]; Morgan v. Oox, 22 
Mo. 373 [66 Am.Dec. 623]; Rally v. Ayers, 3 Sneed 677; 
lVright v. Olark, 50 Vt. 130 [28 Am.Rep. 496].)" (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case of Frazzini v. Oable, 114 Ca1.App. 444, 456 
[300 P. 121], the court quoted the rule as stated in Rudd v. 
Byrnes, S1tpra, 156 Cal. 636, 640, and concluded that the Rudd 
case disposed "of appellant's claim that ordinary care was 
all that was required." 
It thus becomes apparent that almost all jurisdictions im-
') 
) 
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pose a very high standard of care upon the users of firearms 
and that in California this high standard has been interpreted 
as meaning that a person who injures another in discharging 
a firearm can only escape liability by showing "that he was 
absolutely without fault." 
As stated in the majority opinion, the evidence discloses 
that the defendant was sitting on the patio of his home firing 
at birds with a .22 caliber rifle; that his home was near the 
junction of two public roads; that the area was a populated 
farm area; that defendant knew that children were in the 
area of Wren Road; that Wren Road was less than 180 yards, 
beyond the strawberry patch into which defendant was firing; 
and that the body of Bonnie Ann Jensen was found on Wren 
Road approximately 200 yards from the point of firing. The 
only evidence offered by defendant as an excuse for the shoot-
ing consisted of his testimony that he had used care in the 
handling of the gun; that he had looked up and down Wren 
Road before shooting and found it to be clear; that he had 
aimed into the strawberry patch; and that even if extended 
beyond the strawberry patch his line of fire would have been 
somewhat to the north of where the body of the victim was 
found. There was conflicting expert testimony as to whether 
or not the bullet might have ricocheted. Looking at the evi-
dence as a whole it is difficult to say that there was any evi-
dence upon which a jury could find that the defendant was 
entirely free from blame or that he was "absolutely without 
fault. " Neither the fact that defendant looked both ways be-
fore shooting nor the fact that he was not aiming at thechil-
dren is sufficient to exonerate him from liability in a case 
of this type particularly since he had seen the children get 
off the bus and knew they were in the area. Likewise the 
mere fact that a bullet may have ricocheted cannot of itself 
exonerate one injuring another with a firearm since it is a 
well known fact that bullets frequently glance off objects and 
travel in other than the exact direction of fire. Defendant 
admitted that he fired in the direction of the road on which he 
had previously seen the children walking. It is true that 
the evidence shows that the defendant did exercise some 
care and that he did not intend to harm the victim but it 
is extremely doubtful that such evidence can support a find· 
ing that the defendant was "absolutely without fault." A 
verdict for the defendant based upon evidence of this char-
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to the standard of care required of the defendant in order 
to relieve him from liability. Had such an instruction been 
given a different verdict might have been returned. Hence, it is 
my opinion that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in refusing to give the jury the instruction offered by plain-
tiffs to the effect that "One who causes injury to another by 
discharging a firearm must, in order to excuse himself from 
liability show that he was absolutely without fault." The 
language of this instruction was taken verbatim from the 
opinion of this court in Ru,dd v. Byrnes, supra, 165 Cal. 636. 
Such is and should be the law of California, and an instruc-
tion of this type was necessary to fully apprise the jury of the 
extremely high standard of care required of the users of 
firearms. The mere fact that other instructions were given, 
indicating that defendant was required to use extrem~ cau-
tion and extraordinary care, is not sufficient. As pointed 
out in the foregoing discussion the standard of care for users 
of firearms has been stated in different language by various 
courts in other jurisdictions. Some require great care, some 
extraordinary care and in still others the standard is so high 
that a person injuring another by firing a gun can only escape 
liability by showing that he was entirely free of blame. Cali· 
fornia has adopted the latter view as expressed in Rudd v. 
Byrnes, supra, 156 Cal. 636, and an instruction expressly 
setting out such a standard should have been given, and was 
necessary, to fully apprise the jury of the standard of care 
required of the defendant in this case. 
Respondent '8 petition for a rehearing was denied May 18, 
1955. 
